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Linking North and South. Indiana University Press, $40.00 ISBN
978-0-253-01181-7
A Railroad That Could Have Been
H. Roger Grant has written an interesting book about something that did not
happen. Grant, author of thirty books and an expert on railroads in the United
States, examines a proposed antebellum railroad that would have connected
Charleston with Cincinnati in an unusual instance of intersectional planning.
Construction did not proceed as planned and Grant uses the opportunity to
speculate that a healthy LC & C would have influenced American history,
perhaps to the point of changing the trajectory towards war. Railroad enthusiasts
will certainly like this book -- it seems to be intended for a general audience -but Civil War scholars should find the last chapter an interesting exercise in
Civil War causation.
On July 4, 1836 nearly 400 delegates met in Knoxville to discuss the
potential railroad. They elected Robert Y. Hayne of South Carolina as the first
president of the LC & C and formed committees to examine all aspects of
construction. An early estimate pegged the cost at $10,800, which would be
approximately $222.6 million today. Subscription books were opened and
residents of South Carolina, Tennessee, and Ohio bought much of the stock. The
states of South Carolina and Tennessee even pledged money to support the
project. Company directors established the South-Western Rail-Road Bank to
handle the finances and things seemed to be proceeding apace.
Despite this promising start, the railroad was bedeviled by problems. The
level of technological and engineering expertise was an obvious issue. Surveying
proposed routes for the line was difficult and dangerous work. Finding a way
through the Appalachian Mountains was an even bigger obstacle. Bridging the
Ohio River would be no easy task. When company officials selected a route that
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would run along the French Broad River, they immediately split their backers
into factions. Delegates from Georgia had already raised a stink about having the
railroad pass through their state, but John Calhoun caused a greater problem. The
"cast iron man," who was a delegate to Knoxville, insisted that the route go right
past his plantation. Hayne, according to Grant, carefully examined Calhoun's
plan and rejected it. As a consequence, Calhoun severed his ties with the LC & C
and backed a distinctly southern railroad instead. The Panic of 1837 did not help
matters but the company shouldered on and completed the line's extension to
Columbia, South Carolina. A bigger blow came when Hayne died in 1839.
James Gadsden became LC & C president and cast his lot with Calhoun when he
pushed for a railroad across the South. The company fizzled out soon thereafter
and the railroad merged with another intrastate line to become the South
Carolina Rail Road. It was only during the Gilded Age that a direct line between
Cincinnati and Charleston emerged.
Grant uses his narrative to touch on a number of important topics. For
instance, despite the staggering estimate to build the LC & C, supporters did not
shrink from their efforts to lay the rails. As Grant puts it on page 68, there was
no "Jefferson nostalgia about defending the yeoman farmer" that prevented the
delegates from dreaming about linking Charleston and Cincinnati. Many
southerners, in other words, were not laggards when it came to internal
improvements and attempts at industrialization. Nor were southerners concerned
that the proposed railroad and the concomitant growth that it nourished would
impair slavery. Grant dwells on these topics briefly and I would have appreciated
more discussion on them. Another area where Grant could have provided
stronger analysis concerns the interaction of the corporation with nature.
Specifically, company literature promised that the new line would "break down
the mountain barriers" (67, 92). Such statements about the ability of humans to
impose their will on the natural world call for historical interpretation but there
was painfully little environmental history in the book.
My dissertation advisor counseled me never to engage in counterfactual
speculation in class because then the student knows as much as the professor.
Such concerns aside, Grant delves into counterfactual speculation about the
influence of a completed LC & C. Charleston did not have a good river to the
interior and the LC & C would have served as a "classic developmental railroad"
(154). He makes the interesting point that a healthy line would have benefitted
Knoxville and Chattanooga, and perhaps even Greenville and Spartanburg. By
contrast, Atlanta, which owed much of its vitality to railroads, probably would
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have been smaller. All of this is quite plausible. Grant extends his speculation
when discussing the potential reorientation of trade. The LC & C could have
enhanced the closeness of the Old Northwest and the Atlantic South by
facilitating commercial commitments and personal contacts. Many southerners
believed that intersectional commerce checked abolitionism and strengthened
unionism. In short, the failure of the LC & C might have contributed to the Civil
War. Here, Grant relies on Marc Egnal and seems to be swimming against the
current historiographical tide. Grant is a careful historian and he is not blaming
the Civil War on the railroad's demise. The points he raises are worthy of
consideration because they get to the root of how historians view the sectional
conflict. In this case, a materialist interpretation is paramount but those who
point to ideological reasons or the conflict over the expansion of slavery might
not be convinced. Whether or not you agree with Grant's argument, he has
written a well-researched book that should make you think about the antebellum
South and the coming of the Civil War.
Robert Gudmestad is an Associate Professor at Colorado State University
and the author of Steamboats and the Rise of the Cotton Kingdom. He is
currently working on a study of gunboats on the Mississippi River system in the
Civil War. You may reach him at Robert.Gudmestad@colostate.edu.
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